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THE PROPOSED UNIFORM [?] COMMERCIAL CODE
SHOULD NOT BE ADOPTED
FREDERICK K. BEUTELt
THE American Law Institute and the Commissioners on Uniform Laws at
their joint meeting in connection with the American Bar Association last fall
finally approved the text of the Uniform Commercial Code,1 which is an
attempt to codify within one unit the heart of the entire commercial law of
the United States. The much heralded act is now ready for adoption by the
various state legislatures.
As has been indicated in detail elsewhere,2 measured by the area it seeks to
control, this is probably the most ambitious piece of codification undertaken in
this country during the century. Although the process of drafting has taken six
or seven years, considering the monumental size of the task and the preoccu-
pation of the draftsman with other work,8 a period of twice that time by a full
time staff would not have been too long.4 It has been hurriedly drafted and
relentlessly pushed through the American Law Institute and the Commission
on Uniform Laws with very little real consideration by the members of the
bodies involved. Although the Code also carries the prestige of these two great
organizations as also indicated elsewhere,5 it has not had the quality of drafts-
manship or diligent consideration with which the American Law Institute
Restatements were compiled. There also has been little or no impartial re-
search into the economic needs of the business community which the Code
attempts to regulate in detail. The effect of this sort of authorship and pro-
cedure on Article 4 of the Code will be discussed in detail herein.
tProfessor of Law, University of Nebraska.
1. The current edition is, THE AMERICAN LAW INsTITUTE, NATIONAL CONrERENCE
Of COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE (Final Text
Ed. November 1951). Hereafter it will be cited only by Article or Section number.
2. Beutel, Tire Proposed Uniform Commercial Code a.s a Problem in Codificationl,
16 LAW AND CONT. PROB. 140 (1951).
3. The Code was a spare time occupation. The draftsmen and advisors had full
time work elsewhere, most of them as teachers in University Law Schools. Professor
Llewellyn, the chief draftsman, during the time the Code was in process taught a full
time schedule at Columbia and Harvard Law Schools, was on the Executive Committee
as President Elect and President of the Association of American Law Schools and car-
ried on numerous other professional activities.
4. The Commercial Codes of France and Germany which are comparable in scope
but do not deal with such complicated subject matter required froni seven to ten years
time of the best legal minds in the two countries. See 21 COMMERCIAL LAWS OF TIE
WORLD 5, 24 id. at 6.
5. Beutel, supra note 2, at 143-4.
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The Code will be offered to the New York Legislature for adoption in the
present session which began the first week in January, and has the support not
only of the American Law Institute, the Commission of Uniform Laws and the
American Bar Association, but in addition, the hearty approval of the American
Banker's Association and perhaps other pressure groups. Its passage, therefore,
seems certain unless organized opposition arises immediately. This is made ex-
tremely difficult because the present text was not published until last December G
and the commissioners' notes which are an integral part of the code7 were not
yet available at the time this article was written. It seems clear therefore, that
the strategy of its supporters is to push the act for adoption in New York before
the final draft can have careful study.
It is impossible in an article of this sort to begin to cover all of the details of
such a tremendous work as the Uniform Commercial Code purports to be. It
is possible here only to outline major characteristics and indications which point
to ultimate conclusions regarding the value of the Code and the advisability of
its adoption by state legislatures. But a hurried study of the present text together
with a careful following of the history of the Code through its various drafts
leads the writer, although he was one of the original advocates of a commercial
code,s to the reluctant conclusion that the Code should not be adopted in its pre-
sent form for the following reasons:
Considering the size and importance of the project, it contains little of sub-
stantive enactment that is new, and it is not up to the quality of the laws it seeks
to repeal.
The language used in the new Code is strange, unduly complicated and not
as uniform or as workable as that in the present Uniform Statutes covering the
same subjects.
It is not a code at all but a collection of isolated and impractical statutes, which
will, if enacted, cause great confusion in the commercial world.
The alleged Code does not offer sufficient predictable improvement in the sub-
stance of the laws now enacted in the current statutes to justify the tremendous
task involved in the repeal and replacement of the present Uniform Laws.
Article 4 on Bank Deposits and Collections is an unfair piece of class legis-
lation maneuvered through the American Law Institute and the Commission on
Uniform Laws by pressure groups favoring the bankers over their customers.
In such a form it has been, and will probably be, declared unconstitutional in
many states.
6. Although the Code bears a November, 1951, date it did not reach the Institute
members until after December first.
7. § 1-102.(3) (f). Commissioners' notes, called comments, on Articles 1, 2, 4, and 7
came to the writer February 2, 1952.
8. As far back as 1932 the writer recommended complete codification of the uniform
commercial laws. Beutel, The NJ.L. Should Not Be Amended, 80 U. or PA. L. RT.
368, 385 (1932); see also BEum.'s BRANNAN'S NEGOTIABLE INSTRUIENr L'w 1124,
(5th ed., 1932); Beutel, The Proposed Bank Collection Act and Possibility of Recodi-
fication of the Law of Negotiable Instruments, 9 TUTLAN- L. Rs,. 378 (1935).
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The Code as a whole is not a credit to its sponsors and if enacted will destroy
uniformity and cause unnecessary confusion in the law.
It will benefit mostly the bankers and lawyers at the expense of the rest of
the business community.
It should, therefore, be returned to the Institute for elimination of the cur-
rent defects.
THE SCOPE OF THE CODE
The Code by its own provisions 9 is intended to repeal and replace seven cur-
rent Uniform Laws and a number of widely adopted non-uniform statutes. The
Uniform Laws to be repealed are the Negotiable Instruments Law, the Ware-
house Receipts Act, the Stock Transfer Act, the Sales Act, the Bills of Lading
Act, the Trusts Receipt Act, and the Conditional Sales Act. The first three of
these have been adopted in every state in the union and in most of the terri-
tories.' 0 The Bills of Lading Act has been enacted, with variations, by the
Federal government 11 and by thirty-two states and territories ;12 the Sales Act
in thirty-seven,' 3 the Trusts Receipts Act by twenty-seven 14 and the Conditional
Sales Act by twelve.' 5 But the latter has counterparts in numerous statutes
adopted in those states which have not seen fit to take on the Uniform Act.
The non-uniform but widely adopted statutes which this Code will also re-
peal include among others, the American Banker's Association Bank Collections
Code adopted in twenty or more states,1 the bulk transfer laws which appear
in the statutes of almost all jurisdictions in slightly varying forms and numerous
statutes having to do with the rights of creditors and the relationships of banks
to their depositors.
The first question that arises is whether it is a wise policy to repeal five major
and almost unanimously adopted and two minor but well established Uniform
Laws and a host of lesser statutes to be replaced by this one Code. The answer,
of course, must depend upon a comparison of the statutes proposed to those
being replaced.
Articles 2, 3 and 7 on Sales, Commercial Paper and Documents of Title cover
almost the identical material found in the Sales Act, Negotiable Instruments
Law, Warehouse.Receipts Act and Bills of Lading Act. These Articles cover
respectively: Sales-twenty-five percent, Commercial paper-nineteen percent,
and Documents of Title-eleven percent of the volume of the new Code. As
9. § 10-102.
10. See 5 UNIFOrt LAWs ANN. 6 (1950 Supp.)4 3 id. at 6; 6 id. at 6.
11. 39 Stat. 538 (1916) ; 48 U.S.C. ch. 4, § 81 et seq. (1948).
12. 4 UmFORM LAWS ANN. 6 (1950 Supp.).
13. 1 UNIFORm LAWs ANN. 6 (1950 Supp.).
14. 9A UNIFOR, LAws ANN. 274 (1951).
15. 2 UNIFORm LAvS ANN. 6 (1950 Supp.).
16. See BEuTmr's BRANNAN ON NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS (7th ed., 1948) 133.
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shown by the table of cross references in previous editions of the proposed Code,17
these articles comprising fifty-five percent of the whole, although in totally dif-
ferent language, contain approximately the same subject matter as these cur-
rently adopted Uniform Laws, and little else.
Article 8, Investment Securities, constituting eight percent of the Code and
Article 9, Secured Transactions, covering sixteen percent, involve material in
the Uniform Stock Transfer Act and the Unifonn Conditional Sales Act with a
number of major additions which will be discussed below. Thus seventy-nine
percent of the new Code is a re-enactment of current uniform statutes. Article
4 on Bank Collections and Article 6 on Bulk Transfers involve almost the same
theory now codified in the American Banker's Association Bank Collections
Code and the various bulk transfer acts. Thus ninety percent of the Code involves
re-codification of current statutes. Article 5, Documentary Letters of Credit,
constituting about three percent of the whole is new. The balance of the Code
is taken up with definitions and rules for interpretation. In fact over twenty
percent of the entire volume is scope notes and definitions, a defect which will
be discussed in detail later.
Thus it will be seen that the Code as a whole contains little subject matter
that is new. One of the draftsmen has said, "Most of the Code is merely restate-
ment."' s There is, therefore, no urgent need for adopting it unless it is a great
improvement on the current law. A detailed comparison of the statutes will
show that this is not the case.
THE LANGUAGE USED BY THE CODE IS UNNEcEsSAILY TECHNICAL,
NEW AND ERRATIc
Numerous commentators including the present writer have pointed out again
and again that, defying the practice normally found in codes of using current
legal language, this Commercial Code has created an entirely new and strange
vocabulary.' 9 It should be noted here that the highly successful commercial
codes of Europe used the ordinary legal terminology to such an extent that
17. See UNnoRm COMMERCIAL CODE XXV-XXXIV, 341-352 (Proposed Final Draft
Spring 1950).
18. Gilmore, The Secured Transactions .Article of the Coumnercial Code, 16 LAw
Am Co.. PRoB. 27, 27 (1951).
19. Villiston, The Law of Sales in the Proposed Conimereial Code, 63 HAnv. L.
RV 561, 569 et seq. (1950); Rabel Sales Law in the Proposed Conzmercial Code, 17
U. oF CHIC. L. REv. 427, 430 et seq. (1950) ; Rheinestein, Conflict of Laws it the U:iform
Commercial Code, 16 LAw AND CoNT. PROB. 114 (1951); Kripke, The Secured Trars-
actions Provisions of the Uniform Conmmrcial Code, 35 VA. L REv. 577, 601, 615 (1949) ;
Palmer, Negotiable Instruments Under the Uniform Cozmercial Code, 4'S MIc. L. R%,.
255 (1950); Waite, The Proposed New Uniform Sales Act, 4S lc. L Rr=. 603, 604
et seq. (1950) ; Ireton, The Proposed Comwercial Code, A Ne-w Deal in Chattel Security,
43 IuL. L. REv. 794, 818 (1949); Beutel, The Proposed Uniform Co~nswrcial Code as a
Problem in Codification, 16 LAw AND Coxr. ProB. 141, 145 et seq. (1951) ; Beutel, Com-
parison of the Proposed Commercial Code Art. 3 and The Negotiable Instrunents L=w,
39 N.-. L. REv. 531, 533 et seq. (1951): ef. Gilmore. The Secured Transacti.n Article
of the Conmrnercial Code, 16 Lxw .D CoxT. PRoB. 27, 28 (1951), Everett, Securin'g
Security, id. at 49, 51 et seq.
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
they have practically no definitions.20 This Code is made up of highly technical
and exotic language requiring a whole set of new terms which in most cases
are defined differently from the sense in which they are used in the current com-
mercial acts familiar to the Bench, the Bar, and the commercial practice. As
indicated above, over twenty percent of the volume of this Code is made up of
definitions of new terms and re-defining of old ones. The Code contains over
one hundred and seventy such specially defined words and of this number less
than a third are used in the same meaning throughout the entire Code. The rest
take on particular connotations for the special articles in which they are used.
The definitions are also cumulative; that is, defined terms are used in later
definitions. So any variation of meaning is multiplied as it appears in later defi-
nitions. This sets a very intricate trap for the unwary. To illustrate the extent
to which the draftsmen have employed this technique of definition upon defini-
tion, hereafter the words in quoted parts of the Code which have been defined
elsewhere will be placed in italics.
The writer has set out in detail elsewhere 21 over a hundred instances in which
the Code uses words in an unnatural connotation. Most of these difficulties which
still appear in the final draft need not be repeated here; but by way of illustra-
tion it might be noted that among many others still flourishing are: "A person
gives value" among others "by taking delivery"22 and the identical words are
also used in another place 28 to define "value" itself. A "bona fide purchaser" is
defined 24 without the requirement of good faith, contrary to the common
Anglo-American usage.25 "'Purchase' includes taking by sale mortgage,
pledge, lien, issue or re-issue, gift [!] or any other [ 1] voluntary transaction
creating an interest in property."' 26 "'Bank' means any person engaged in the
business of banking,"2 7 obviously a banker, not a bank. "'Creditor' means an
unsecured creditor and includes any representative of creditors, ' 28 also mean-
ing fiduciary? Many others are discussed below.
Of the total definitions, over one hundred and thirty of the specially de-
fined words are used in that part of the act which deals with the subject
20. In this respect contrast Louisiana's civil code, Book III, Title VII (Dainow
1947) (taken from French Civil Code) pp. 448 et seq. and German Civil Code, Seventh
Section (Chang Hai Wang's Trans. 1907) pp. 95 et seq., with Article 2 of the proposed
Commercial Code; Compare also German Cheque Law, 25 COmmERCIAL LAWS OF Tut:
WORLD, 481 et seq.;, with Article 3. It should be noted further that the Constitution of the
United States, probably the most successful codification in history contains not a single
definition. Cf. Franklin, The Legal Method of the Uniform Commercial Code, 16 LAW
AND CONT. PROB. 330 (1951); Rabel, Sales Law in the Proposed Conmmercial Cod4e, 17
U. OF CHICAGO L. REv. 427 (1950).
21. Beutel, The Proposed Uniform Comnercial Code as a Problem in Codification,
16 LAW AND CONT. PROB. 141, 145 et seq. (1951).
22. § 7-102 (1, g, iii), § 9-108(1, c).
23. § 8-303(c).
24. § 8-302.
25. See BLAcK's LAW DICrIONARY 143, 144 (1891).
26. § 1-201(32).
27. § 1-201(4).
28. § 1-201(12); cf. "lien creditor" § 9-301(3).
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matter of the present uniform laws to be replaced by this Code. It is signi-
ficant that these uniform acts, though they were written by different drafts-
men and across a period of over thirty years, in their collective similar de-
finitions get along with less than eighty specifically defined terms, and a
large proportion of most of these are used in identical meanings throughout
all of the acts. Why the authors of the Commercial Code are so set to dis-
card this long established uniformly adopted and judicially interpreted legal
vocabulary for a totally new set of terms is one of the legal mysteries of the
twentieth century. And their resolute refusal to reform the language after
the defects have been exposed can only be explained by a stubborn and un-
justifiable pride in authorship, never a characteristic of experienced drafts-
men.
It was, of course, necessary in some instances for the codifiers to redefine
some terms upon which judicial decisions had varied, but these were a decided
minority of all the terminology and did not call for a fifty percent addition
of new definitions. It suffices to say here that these new terms would greatly
and unnecessarily increase the commercial, legal and judicial confusion in-
cumbent upon the change from the established acts to the new Code if it
were ever adopted.
THE TERmINOLOGY Is NoT As UNIFIED As IN CURRENT UNIFoRm LAws
One reading this Code gets the impression that the draftsmen met and
agreed upon a few basic terms then seized their typevriters and rushed off
in at least seven different directions never to return again to correlate their
work.
There are certain basic terms and concepts which run throughout all com-
mercial transactions; among these are value, good faith, the concept of hold-
er in due course, bona fide purchaser, notice, customer, accounts, goods, issue,
and many more. None of these terms are used in the same sense throughout
the Code. In fact, they have a whole series of multifarious and .conflicting
meanings.
At the penalty of being tedious, a few examples should perhaps be set out.
Valhe has at least four different meanings. In Article 3 on Commercial
Paper, it is a performed contract,2 9 a revival to the rule of Clayton's 30 case
29. § 3-303: A holder takes the instrument for value
(a) to the extent that the agreed consideration has been performed or that
he acquires a security interest in or a lien on the instrum:ent otherwise than by
legal process; or
(b) when he takes the instrument in payment of or as security for an ante-
cedent claim against any person whether or not the claim is due; or
(c) when he gives a negotiable instrument for it or makes an irrevocable
commitment to a third person.
[The author has supplied emphasis to cover defined terms in this and other sections
of the Code infra.]
30. 1 Mer. 572, 35 Eng. Rep. 781 (1815) ; 1 Story, Equity Jurisprudence 459 (13th
ed. 1SS6) ; see also BEu rE 's BRANNA., op. cit. supra note 16 at 506, et seq.
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that was decided before the area of commercial credit was understood by the
courts. In Article 4 it is a concept of credit designed particularly to protect
banks in all their transactions.8 ' In Articles 7, 8 and 9 we have the idea that
giving credit is value ;32 but in Article 9 also, there is offered a concept of
"'new value" differing considerably from the other three types8 3 Thus this
Code defines three types of value and one new value. It is significant that in
all the uniform laws being proposed to be repealed by this act, value has al-
most identical definitions. Five out of seven used "any consideration sufficient
to support a simple contract, 81 4 and the Negotiable Instruments Law has
practically the same concept with slight variations.8, Thus it appears that in
31. § 4-209: For purposes of determining its status as a holder in due course, the
bank has given value to the extent that it has a security interest in an item provided
that the bank otherwise complies with the requirements of Section 3-302 on what con-
stitutes a holder in due course.
§4-208: (1) A bank has a security interest in an item and any accompanying
documents or the proceeds of either
(a) in case of an item deposited in an account to the extent to which credit
given for the item has been withdrawn or applied;
(b) in all other cases for which it has given credit available for withdrawal
as of right, to the extent of the credit given whether or not the credit is drawn
upon and whether or not there is a right of charge-back.
(2) When credit which has been given for several items received at one time or
pursuant to a single agreement is withdrawn or applied in part the security interest re-
mains upon all the items, any accompanying documents or the proceeds of either until
sufficient proceeds or subsequent deposits have been received to balance withdrawals or
applications.
(3) For the purpose of this section, credits first given are first withdrawn.
32. § 7-102 (g) : A person gives "value" for a document of title if he takes the docu-
ment
(i) in return for any consideration sufficient to support a simple constract in-
cluding the extension of immediately available credit whether or not drawn upon
and whether or not a charge-back is provided for in the event of difficulties in col-
lection; or
(ii) as security for or in total or partial satisfaction of a pre-existing claim;
or
(iii) by taking delivery pursuant to a pre-existing contract for purchase.
Cf. §§ 8-303 and 9-108(1) which is identical; but see § 9-108(2), note 33 in!ra.
33. § 9-108(2). Where a secured party makes an advance, incurs an obligation or
otherwise gives a new value which is to be secured in whole or in part by after-acquired
property his security interest in the after-acquired collateral shall be deemed to be taken
for such new value and not as security for a pre-existing claim if the debtor acquires
his rights in such collateral either in the ordinary course of his business or under con-
tract of purchase made within a reasonable time after the making of the security agree-
ment and pursuant thereto.
34. UNiFoRm SALEs Acr § 76(1) [hereafter cited S.A.], UNIFoRM- BIu or LADINO
Acr § 53 [hereafter cited B.L.A.], UNiFomm STocx TRANSFER Acr § 22 [hereafter cited
S.T.A.], UNrioiat WAREHousE REcEiPTs Acr § 58 [hereafter cited W.R.A.J, UNIFoRM
TRusT REcip'rs Acr § 1 [hereafter cited T.R.A.]. But see id., "New Value," The UNIFORM
CONDITIONAL SALEs Acr § 76(1) [hereafter cited C.S.A.] is silent on the point.
35. Cf. NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW, §§ 25, 27, 191 [hereafter cited N.I.L.].
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this respect the seven separate uniform laws have more unity than the Com-
mercial Code.
Good faith has three different meanings where it is used, and in Article 8 3'
the concept is absent from certain requirements of conduct of a purchaser of
paper. In Article 1, the general definition section, good faith is "honesty in
fact." 37 In the Sales Article it, "in the case of a merchant includes observance
of reasonable commercial standards.138 In Commercial Paper, Article 3 is
a combination of the above two.39 In Articles 4, 5 and 6, though good faith
seems to be required of bankers, the good faith is of a different type from
that required of other people;O in Article 7 41 it is the same as Article 3
and in Article 8, Investment Paper, the concept of "bona fide purchaser" does
not seem to require good faith.4-
In contrast to this, in the current uniform laws wherever it is defined in-
cluding four of the acts, good faith is identically "a thing is done 'in good
faith'... when it is in fact done honestly whether it is done negligently or
not."4 3 The NIL concept, more complicated than the other uniform laws,
is simpler than that set out in the Code; but has been the source of much
diversity of judicial opinion." Here again the current uniform statutes have
better unity than the Code; so much more judicial difficulty can be forecast.
When these various basic elements are combined to form a concept like
holder in due course, the lack of unity in the Code becomes even more strik-
ing.
The good faith purchaser for value of negotiable paper who cuts off de-
fenses and gets better title than his vendor, appears in all sorts of guises.
Although there has been some effort to unify the concept in the definition
of "holder",45 it ends there. In Article 2 he is a "good faith purchaser for
value."4 6 In Articles 3, 4 and 5 he is a "holder in due course" ;47 in Article 7
"a holder to whom a negotiable docuoent of title has been duly negotiated."4 8
36. § 8-302. Section 1-203 requiring performance of every contract in good faith has




39. §3-302(b), in good faith including observance of the reasonable commercial
standards of any business in which the holder may be engaged.
40. § 4-103 (1,3 and 4). Cf. the material discussed under Article 4 infra.
41. § 7-501(4).
42. § 8-302; cf. "notice!' § 8-304.
43. S.A. §76(2); B.L.A. §53(2); W.R.A. §58(2); S.T.A. §22(2).
44. N.I.L. § 52(3), § 56; See Note, 81 U. of PA. L. REv. 617 (1933).
45. § 1-201(20): "Holder" means a person who is in possession of a docaulicnt of
title or an istrumnmt or an investment security drawn, issued or indorsed to him or to
his order or to bearer or in blank.
46. §2-403(1).
47. §3-302, 4-104(3), 4-209, 5-103(3).
48. § 7-502(1).
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Article 8 calls him a "bona fide purchaser,"49 and in Article 9 he has all
three of the above meanings ro plus the designation "assignee who takes his
assignment for value, in good faith and without notice of a claim or a defense,
except as to defenses of the type which may be asserted against a holder in
due course of a negotiable instrument under the Article on Commercial
Paper,"5' and he also has a near kin, "Purchaser for new vahue." 5
2
This single concept in the Code then has six different meanings whereas
in the uniform acts such a holder is known by only three terms: "holder in
due course," 53 "person to whom a negotiable [paper] has been duly negoti-
ated," 54 and "purchaser for value in good faith without notice."5 No reason
has been advanced why one term like holder in due course would not be
sufficient in all cases.
When one examines the ingredients which go to make up the holder in
due course concept in its various forms, the confusing centrifugal force of
the Code becomes even more apparent. Article 2 requires good faith 10 (of
the first and second types indicated above) and for value (of the third
type).. Nothing is said about notice. Under Article 3, the holder in due
course must be for value (of the first type)58 in good faith (of the third
type) 59 and without notice. In Article 4 the same term, holder in due course,
is used but the value requirement is different and holding in due course is
a much narrower concept 60 than under Article 3. In Article 7 the require-
ments are value (different from both values above), 61 good faith (of the
third type) and "in current course of business." 2 Notice does not seem to
be required at all. In Article 8 where the concept appears as "bona fide pur-
chaser"03 value (similar to Article 7)" 4 without notice (entirely different
from notice in Article 3)65 is all that is required. Good faith as indicated
above does not seem to be an ingredient of bona fide purchaser.




53. N.I.L. § 52.
54. S.A. § 33, B.L.A. § 32, W.R.A. § 41.
55. S.T.A. § 7(d, 1).
56. § 1-201(19), § 2-103(1,b).
57. §2-403(1), §2-103(3).
58. § 3-303, supra note 29.
59. § 3-302(b), supra note 39.
60. § 4-209 and 4-208, supra note 31.
61. § 7-102(g), supra note 32.
62. § 7-501(4).
63. § 8-302.
64. § 8-303, cf. § 7-102(g), supra note 32.
65. § 8-304: (1) A purchaser (including a broker for seller or buyer) of a security
is charged with notice of claims of ownership if
(a) the security whether in bearer or registered form has been indorsed "for
collection" or "for surrender" or for some other purpose not involving transfer; or
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In the current uniform acts this concept is the same throughout, requir-
ing value, good faith, and absence of notice, 0 which terms as indicated above
are practically uniform. If economic research, commercial practices, or judi-
cial decisions have in any way necessitated this complete fracturing of the
concept of holding in due course, such facts are nowhere indicated in the
Code and have not come to the attention of the writer. There seems to be
no reason why the holding in due course concept could not be uniform for
commercial paper throughout the entirety of a properly drafted commercial
code. If exceptions were necessary for unique situations, they could easily be
inserted.
Notice is also part of the concept of holding in due course. When one
approaches this subject he comes upon one of the most fantastic combinations
of double-talk and inconsistent uses of terms found any place in the eerie
language of this Commercial Code. To begin with, "notice" is defined at least
twice in Article 1, comes in by reference in other articles many more times,
and like "value" is used in completely inconsistent fashion in the various
articles where it is involved. Sections 1-201(25), (27), (26) contain long
and complicated definitions of "notice," "notification" and "notifies", which
probably include both actual notice and old fashion English common law
constructive notice,6 7 thus opening Pandora's Box in regard to how far con-
structive notices affect holders of negotiable money paper. That constructive
(b) he puchases the security within six months after he has received noti-
fication that it has been lost or stolen; or
(c) the security is in bearer form and has on it an unambiguous statement
that it is the property of a person other than the transferor. The mere writing of
a name on a security is not such a statement.
(2) The fact that the purchaser (including a broker for seller or buyer) has notice
that the registered owner holds the security for a third person or that the security is
registered in the name of a fiduciary does not create a duty of inquiry into the rightful-
ness of the transfer or constitute notice of claims of ownership. If, however, the proceeds
of the purchase are placed by the purchaser in the individual account of the fiduciary or
are made payable in cash or to the fiduciary individually or the purchaser has reason to
know that such proceeds are being used or that the transaction is for the individual bene-
fit of the fiduciary, the purclaer is charged with notice of claims of ownership. Cf.
§ 3-304, note 69 infra.
66. N.I.L. §52, S.A. (Substitute §38), B.L.A. §38, W.R.A. (Substitute §47),
S.T.A. §§4, 7 d(1) and 8.
67. § 1-201(25) (26) and (27) :,A person has "notice" of a fact when
(a) he has actual knowledge of it; or
(b) he has received a nwtice or notification of it; or
(c) from all the facts and circumstances known to him at the time in question
he has reason to know that it exists.
(26) A person "notifies" another by taking such steps as may be reasonably required
to inform the other in ordinary course whether or not such other party actually comes
to know of it.
(27) A person "receives" a notice or iotification when
(a) it comes to his attention; or
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notice is contemplated is shown by the fact that notice from recording acts
had to be specifically excluded later.08 But this definition, although it clearly
applies to all the Articles, is limited as follows: "Subject to additional defi-
nitions ... and unless the context otherwise requires." As indicated below the
context otherwise requires in a number of places.
Section 3-304 which is approximately two pages long in Article 3, is
set out in the margin for handy reference.0 0 It contains "additional defini-
(b) it is duly delivered at the place or business through which the contract
was made or at any other place held out by him as the place for receipt of such
communications.
Notice or a notification received by an organization is effective for a particular trans-
action from the time when it is brought to the attention of the individual conducting
that transaction, and in any event from the time when it would have been brought to
his attention if the organization had exercised due diligence.
68. See § 3-304(6), note 69 infra.
69. § 3-304: Notice to Purchaser.
(1) The purchaser has notice of a claim or defense if
(a) the instrument is so incomplete, bears such visible evidence of forgery or
alteration, or is otherwise so irregular as to call into question its validity, terms
or ownership or to create an ambiguity as to the party to pay; or
(b) the purchaser has notice that the obligation of any party is voidable in
whole or in part, or that all parties have been discharged.
(2) The purclaser has itwice of a claim against the instrument when he has reason-
able grounds to believe
(a) that the transfer to him is a preference voidable under the law of bank-
ruptcy or insolvency;
(b) that a fiduciary has negotiated the instrument in payment of or as security
for his own debt or in any transaction for his own benefit or otherwise in breach
of duty.
(3) Except as provided with respect to conditional, trust or collection indorsenents
in the course of bank collections (Sections 4-203 and 4-205), the purchaser also has
notice of a claim against the instrunwnt if it has previously been indorsed conditionally
or in such manner as to prohibit further negotiation and such indorsement has not been
cancelled.
(4) The purchaser has notice that an instrument is overdue if he has reasonable
grounds to believe
(a) that any part of the principal amount is overdue or that there is an un-
cured default in payment of another instrument of the same series; or
(b) that acceleration of the instrument has been made; or
(c) that he is taking a demand instruentt after demand has been made or
more than a reasonable length of time after its issue. A reasonable time for a
check drawn and payable within the states and territories of the United States
and the District of Columbia is presumed to be thirty days.
(5) Knowledge of the following facts does not of itself give the purchaser notice
of a defense or claim
(a) that the instrument is antedated or postdated;
(b) that it was issued or negotiated in return for an executory promise or
accompanied by a separate agreement, unless the purchaser has notice that a de-
fense or claim has arisen from the terms thereof;
(c) that any party has signed for accommodation;
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tions" of notice; and throughout the Article the context "othenvise re-
quires."70
Under Section 3-304 a purchaser who has notice of a "claim or defense"
apparently cannot be a holder in due course. Although claims and defenses
are key technical words, they are nowhere defined and are certainly not used
in their ordinary meanings. Under Section 3-304(1) a purchaser has notice
of such "claim or defense" when the instrument contains infirmities of various
types as the term is used in the NIL.71 For example, if a drawer draws a
check intended to be payable to bearer and leaves the name of the payee
blank, but has no other defense, it is clear that no claim or defense in the
ordinary sense exists. Yet the purchaser who takes this instrument has
"notice of a claim or defense." On the other hand, if a maker writes a check,
puts in the figures $100 then crosses them out, puts in $150 and issues the
check in that form, it is clear that there is no claim or defense, only an in-
firmity; but under the NIL one cannot be a holder in due course because the
instrument is not regular on its face. However, under this Article, the holder
"has notice of a claim or defense" where none exists and is also not a holder
in due course. Conversely, under subsection (1) (b) a holder does not have
notice of discharge unless he has notice that "all parties have been discharged."
Thus, if a co-maker or surety or indorser has been discharged and the holder
knows it at the time he takes the instrument, it is clear that there are de-
fenses to the instrument and that these defenses are known to the taker. But
under the clear provisions of subsection (1) (b), he does not have notice
of a "defense" and may be a holder in due course. This is not a mere over-
sight but is definitely contemplated by other provisions throughout the act
making him subject to the defense even though a holder in due course. 2 On
the other hand, as to claims against the instrument, it is clear that subsection
(2) contemplates constructive notice of fiduciary claims, thus dragging in
all the exceptions and many more which the Uniform Fiduciary Act created
to Section 56 of the NIL. But by express provisions of subsection (5) and
of the previous commissioners notes to other sections,73 if an instrument be
(d) that an incomplete instrunent has been completed, unless the purchaser
has nwice of any improper completion;
(e) that any person negotiating the instrument is or was a fiduciary;
(f) that there has been default in payment of interest on the instran~t or in
payment of any other instrument, except one of the same series.
(6) The filing or recording of a document does not of itself constitute :otice within
the provisions of this Article to a person who would otherwise be a holder in drie course.
(7) To be effective notice must be received at such time and in such manner as to
give a reasonable opportunity to act on it.
70. Cf. §§ 3-305 (2) (e), 3-415 (4), 3-417 (1) (b), 3-602, 3-603, 3-606 (3). It is not clear
whether §§ 3-501 to 3-511 on presentment, notice and dishonor affect notice as here dis-
cussed, but they may.
71. See Baur's BRANNAN op. cit. supra note 16, at 706.
72. See §3-305(2) (e), §3-602.
73. Proposed Final Draft §§-3-205, 3-206 (Spring 1950).
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indorsed "Pay John Doe in trust for Richard Roe," it is perfectly clear that
it creates on its face notice of Richard Roe's claim on the instrument, but
under the specific provisions of subsection (5) (e) this fact does not give
the purchasers "notice of the claim." Even though he has read the indorse-
ment, the holder can still be a holder in due course and take free of the claim
of Richard Roe even when he knows about it, that is, unless he is charged
with constructive notice under subsection (2) that the fiduciary is operating
in breach of trust. However, by specific provision of subsection (3), except
as provided in the Bank Collection Article 4, a person who takes an instru-
ment conditionally indorsed has "notice of a claim" from the indorsement
even though he gets no such notice from the indorsement in trust.7 4 Just why
there should be a distinction between these different indorsements and how
one can tell from the words of the indorsement when it falls out of one class
and into another, so far as notice is concerned, is quite beyond comprehen-
sion of the ordinary lawyer and is likely to create endless litigation.
So claims may not be "claims," defenses may not be "defenses" and a taker
may have a "notice of claim or defense" where no claim or defense exists.
All of which leads one to wonder what would happen if a man purchased an
instrument under facts which caused him to have "reasonable grounds to
believe"7 5 that this vendor was negotiating in breach of trust, but, when as
a matter of fact, the maker had a defense of fraud which had nothing to do
with the trust. Does or does not the taker have "notice of a claim or defense ?"
The Negotiable Instruments Law is clear on these questions. He must have
actual notice of infirmities, maturity or defects of title 76 or must have taken
in subjective or objective bad faith 77 to deprive him of the rights of a holder
in due course. Just what is the pattern of state of mind and surrounding facts
under Article 3 is anybody's guess.
In Article 4, banks apparently are not charged with notice outside of their
instructions." Likewise, in Article 7 notice of claims apparently does not cut
off due negotiation unless bad faith can be proved30 Article 8, like Article 3,
has another long and complicated section 80 on the subject of notice but in
different words from those found in Article 3, but which will eventually lead
to the same type of difficulty in application of the concept to a series of
commercial facts.81
74. § 3-206(c).
75. § 3-304 (2) (b), supra note 69.
76. N.I.L. § 55.
77. N.I.L. § 52, 56.
78. §4-203, §4-205(2).
79. § 7-501(4).
80. § 8-304 supra note 65; cf. §§ 8-202, 8-305.
81. It should be noted that notice as discussed here is used only as an ingredient of
holding in due course, and does not involve other types of notice to creditors, to indorsers
and to others in matters of that sort; where, again, separate provisions and processes
are created for each Article, to cover each particular situation. For example see note
70 supra.
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It should be noted again that in the current Uniform Acts notice is defined
only once in the Negotiable Instruments Law. Throughout the other sections
the concept is uniformly left to the courts.
This conflict in the meaning of terms is not limited to the concept of hold-
ing in due course and its ingredients, but applies to commercial terms used
all through the code.
Warranty. A second example of a failure to use general terminology is
found in the manner in which the Code deals with the concept of warranty.
Although this subject is currently covered by at least five uniform laws8 2
and the Contracts Restatement.93 all agree that a transferor of commercial
paper whether negotiable or not is subject to at least four basic warranties:
(1) the paper is genuine: (2) the transferor has title or right to transfer;
(3) he has no knowledge of disabling facts; and (4) the obligation is valid."
As is to be expected there is a variation of wording in the statutes but in
many the terminology is almost identical. Unity here would therefore seem
to be indicated, and appears to be possible to accomplish, with variations
necessary only to cover special instances. But what has the Code done?
Articles 3 and 4 though couched in almost entirely different language set out
seven or eight warranties ;85 Article 7 covers three,8s and Article 8 sub-
stantially the same three but in quite different verbiage87 and with some
additions as to agents, brokers', registrars', trustees' and transfer agents'
warranties.85 Now due to different verbiage, it is doubtful if the warranties
set out are coexistent even when the different types of paper appear in the
same transaction; but what is worse, the remaining five articles e-xcept
Sales, Article 2) though they all cover situations where transfers of com-
mercial paper and contracts are involved, seem to be silent on this basic sub-
ject.89 The Sales Article sections on warranties 0o are couched in language
which seems to have no relation to the subject elsewhere in the Code.
Custower has at least two different meanings. In Articles 3 and 4 it is a
person having a bank account; in Article 5 a buyer of credit;91 in none of
these articles is the term used in its most common commercial meaning.
82. N.I.L. §§ 65, 66; S.A. §§ 13-16, 36; B.L.A. §§ 35, 36; ,V.R.A. §§ 44, 45; S.T.A.
§11.
83. § 175.
84. See BEuTL, MATMALS AND CASES ON UrnoR ComumcIAL LAws 410 (1950).
85. §§ 3-417, 4-207.
86. § 7-507.
87. § 8-306(1).
88. §§ 8-306(2), 8-208.
89. But see § 9-206(3).
90. §§2-312 to 2-318.
91. §§ 3-102(3) ; 4-104(1) (e) : "Customer" means any pcrson having an account
with a bank or for whom a bank has agreed to collect items and includes a bank carry-
ing an account with another bank.
§ 5-103(1) (g): A "customer" is a buyer or other terson who causes a banh
to issue a credit.
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Account has at least 02 three defined meanings. In Articles 3 and 4 it means
bank account;93 in Article 9 it has contradictory definitions. In 9-105 (a),
"Account Debtor means the person who is indebted on account, chattel
paper or contract right;"
while in 9-106 it means
"a right to payment for goods sold or leased or for services rendered
which is not evidenced by chattel paper."
9 4
"Goods" also has three definitions 95 and is further complicated in Article
2 by "Future goods," "Lot" and "Commercial Unit"90 and in Article 9 by
the terms "Consumer's Goods," "Equipment," "Farm Products" and "in-
ventory" which terms all seem to be included in the definition of goods but
are not mutually exclusive.
07
Even casual readings of the Code will disclose many more cases where
words are used in multiple meanings.0 8
IT Is NOT A CODE BUT AN UNWORKABLE COLLECTION OF STATUTES
One of the chief characteristics of a good code is that it states in simplified
outline the basic law governing the transactions which it seeks to regulate.
From what has already been said it is clear that this Uniform Commercial
Code is not a code at all but a collection of highly technical, uncorrelated
statutes attempting to regulate in detail a series of unrelated and minute
commercial transactions. The definitions of terms used indicate that in al-
most every section the draftsmen have attempted to provide for particular
situations or to codify known judicial decisions.
If the needs of the regulation of commerce required it, lawyers, courts and
business men could probably learn this new vocabulary. It would perhaps
take a period of twenty-five or fifty years of confusion due to delving into
the implications of each term before they became clear to the "trade." Theo-
retically each type of paper and each class of transactions might eventually
develop its own particular intricate rules which differed from every other.
But practically, this type of law is not workable in modern business because
various types of commercial paper and goods are transferred simultaneously
92. For use in another sense see § 3-206.
93. §§ 3-102(3); 4-104(1) (a): "Account" means any account with a bank and in-
cludes a checking, time, interest or savings account.
94. Of course it is intellectually possible to distinguish between account as used in
"Account Debtor" and in "Account"; but what is the practical value of this type of in-
tellectual gymnastics when there are plenty of other words available to express the
ideas ?
95. §§2-105, two; 9-105(f); See §2-107.
96. § 2-105.
97. § 9-109.
98. A few of these are: "Money" §§ 1-201(24), 3-107; "Issuer" §§3-102(1) (a),
5-103(c), 7-102(1) (f), 8-201; "Buyer in ordinary course of business" §§ 1-201(9), 2-402,
3-302(b), 9-307; See § 7-501(4).
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and in the same transactions. Single sales often involve the exchange of
goods, documents of title and negotiable money paper. Security transactions
more often than not require the simultaneous transfer of stocks, bonds, com-
mercial paper, and documents of title. As this "Code" is now drawn, from
two to six conflicting rules of law may apply to the rights of the parties to
the same transaction. Each type of paper and goods has its own legal vo-
cabulary and set of rules governing its particular transfer. Thus a confusion
is assured and uniform application of the law becomes an impossibility.
One of the commonest transactions in banking is the transfer of drafts
with documents of title attached. Under the proposed "Code", if both types
of paper were stolen, a bank taking a transfer of such paper for credit would
be both a holder in due course of the draft 19 and "a holder to whom the
document of title has been duly negotiated,"'0" of the document of title; but
a merchant taking the same paper for credit is a holder to whom the "docu-
ment has been duly negotiated" of the document of ile 101 but not a holder
in due course of the draft .102 Translating the language, the bank has both in-
struments free of the defenses and claims of the former owner. The merchant
has such rights in the document of title, but must return the draft to its true
owner even though the transaction contemplates that the document of title
shall be held as security for the draft. Further, if the merchant took the paper
in chain of title after the bank, then he may possibly hold both instruments
free from the rights of the former owner.0 3 But if he preceded the bank he
would be in the predicament indicated.
Under the present uniform laws all the cases above would be treated alike.
Both the bank and the merchant would, under the words of the statutes, be
holders for value and would take it free from defenses or claims of former
owners.
10 4
Due to the lack of unity in the "Code," difficulties of this sort are inherent
in every transaction where two or more types of goods or paper are trans-
ferred as part of the same business deal. In addition to the fact that every
type of paper has its own intricate set of rules of law, it must be born in mind
that bankers, 05 brokers,'0 6 merchants ' 07 and just ordinary people have
99. §§ 4-209, 4-208, supra note 31.
100. §§ 7-502, 7-501.
101. §§7-501, 7-102(g), supra note 32.
102. § 3-303 supra note 29.
103. §§ 4-209, 3-306, 3-201. The bank is a holder in due course only to the extent
of its lien, §4-208; and § 3-201 (1) gives the transferee only the rights of the transferor.
The courts would probably apply the principal of Burnes v. New Mineral Fertilizer
Company, 218 Mass. 300, 105 N.E. 1074 (1914), that to protect the bank's security in-
terest, the purchaser, not a holder in due course, could collect the face of the note.
104. N.I.L. §§ 25, 56; see conflicting cases. BEuTm's BRAizz, supra note 16, § 493;
S.A. § 76 (substitute § 38); B.LA. §§ 53, 38; W.R.A. § 5S (substitute § 47).
105. Among others see §§4-102, 4-103(3), 4-209, 4-203.
106. Among others see §§ 8-313, 8-318, 8-306(2), 2-104(1), 2-707.
107. Among others see §§2-103(1)(b), 2-104(3), 2-201(2), 2-205, 2-209(2), 2-603.
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separate rules governing their business conduct even though they are en-
gaged in the same transactions.
Just what the business world can make out of this maze of "gobbledygook"
remains to be seen. If so comparatively simple a statute as the Negotiable
Instruments Law caused numerous conflicting court decisions it is certain
that this "Code" will cause monumental conflict which would be much more
widely dispersed than any now surrounding the present uniform statutes.
THE RULES OF INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION ARE IMPRACTICAL
Seeds of even greater confusion are embodied in those provisions of the
"Code" indicating what law applies to a particular transaction. Section 1-
105, which purports to codify the rules of conflict of laws governing the ap-
plication of the "Code", sets up four separate rules to be applied by the
courts depending upon which of the articles is involved. Sales, Article 2;
Documentary Letters of Credit, Article 5; and Documents of Title, Article
7, have one set of rules. Commerical Paper, Article 3; and Bank Deposits
and Collections, Article 4, have another. Investment Securities, Article 8,
still a third. Bulk Transfers, Article 6; and Secured Transactions, Article 9;
a fourth. These four rules of law, set out in the margin,1 08 are in substance
somewhat alike. Roughly, they provide that whenever a transaction whose
subject matter is covered by this "Code" in any way touches the forum, this
108. § 1-105: Applicability of the Act; Parties' Right to Choose Applicable
Law.
(1) Article 1 applies to any contract or transaction to which any other Article of
this Act applies.
(2) The Articles on Sales (Article 2), Documentary Letters of Credit (Article 5)
and Documents of Title (Article 7) apply whenever any contract or transaction within
the terms of any one of the Articles is made or occurrs after the effective date of this
Act and the contract
(a) is made, offered or accepted or the transaction occurs within this state;
or
(b) is to be performed or completed wholly or in part within this state; or
(c) relates to or involves goods which are to be or are in fact delivcred,
shipped or received within this state; or
(d) involves a bill of lading, warehouse receipt or other docunent of title
which is to be or is in fact issued, delivered, sent or received within this state; or
(e) is an application or agreement for a credit made, sent or received within
this state, or involves a credit issued in this state or under which drafts are to be
presented in this state or confirmation or advice of which is sent or received within
this state, or involves any negotiation within this state of a draft drawn under a1
credit.
(3) The Articles on Commercial Paper (Article 3) and Bank Deposits and Col.
lections (Article 4) apply whenever any contract or transaction within the terms of
either of the Articles is made or occurs after the effective date of this Act and the
contract
(a) is made, offered or accepted or the transaction occurs within this state; or
(b) is to be performed or completed wholly or in part within this state; or
[Vol. 61:334
1952] PROPOSED UNIFORM [?] COMMERCIAL CODE 351
"Code" shall apply. Not only is it in "disregard of any known sysiem of con-
flict of laws ;-109 and denounced by all authorities writing on the subject ;""
but if ever enacted it would be the destruction of uniformity; and would con-
tinually raise the spectre of choice of forum which is the bane of the existence
of practicing lawyers and businessmen alike.
The draftsmen glibly justify this exception by a naive argument about as
follows: "It is a good code so let's apply it in all possible cases." Although
one might doubt the major premise, the practical results of adopting such an
argument would be disastrous. Take for example a hypothetical case. A mer-
chant in Boston buys goods in San Francisco giving a negotiable note pay-
able in thirty days. The San Francisco vendor discounts the note at his
bank, with chattel paper or collateral attached. The goods are shipped across
country passing through about fifteen states. The "Code" is not in effect in
either Massachusetts or California, but, in the process of collection the note
is indorsed in New York where the "Code" has been enacted. The parties
to the transaction under Section 1-105 may find themselves bound by rules
of law in any one of the fifteen states where the "Code" may be enacted and
where either party might choose to sue.
The whole Section 1-105 is obviously a club to force adoption of the
"Code" in all states, but if it were so adopted that would not end the dif-
ficulty. The history of well-drafted uniform laws such as the Sales Act and
Negotiable Instruments Law has shown that interpretation of the best lang-
(c) involves commercial paper which is made, drawn or transferred within
this state.
(4) The Article on Investment Securities (Article 8) applies whenever any con-
tract or transaction within its terms is made or occurs after the effective date of this
Act and the contract
(a) is made, offered or accepted or occurs within this state; or
(b) is to be performed or completed wholly or in part within this state; or
(c) involves an investwent security issued or transferred within this state.
But the validity of a corporate security shall be governed by the law of the jurisdiction
of incorporation.
(5) The Articles on Bulk Transfers (Article 6) and Secured Transactions (Article
9) apply whenever any contract or transaction within their terms is made or occurs
after the effective date of this Act and falls within the provisions of Section 6-102 or
Sections 9-102 and 9-103.
(6) Whenever a contract, instrument, document, security or transaction bears a rea-
sonable relationship to one or more states or nations in addition to this state the
parties may agree that the law of any such other state or nation shall govern their rights
and duties. In the absence of an agreement which meets the requirements of this sub-
section, this Act governs.
109. Rabel, The Sales Law in the Proposed Conwnrcial Code, 17 U. oF CHL L RM'.
427, 428 (1950).
110. See Rheinstein, Conflict of Laws in the Uniform Commercial Code, 16 LAx%
AND CONT. PROB. 114, 115 (1951) and numerous authorities there cited; Rheinstein, Book
Review, 26 IND. L. J. 576, 581 (1951) ; Beutel, The Proposcd Unifonn Commercial Code,
16 id. 141, 160 et seq.
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uage (to say nothing of the extra difficulties made certain by the exotic
phraseology in this "Code") is bound to reach conflicting results in various
states.-" With a provision such as Section 1-105, then, legal advice will be
impossible because it will have to take into consideration court decisions in-
terpreting the "Code" where it could not even have been foreseen that the
law would apply, simply because of a fortuitous routing of shipment, col-
lection, and like transactions beyond the control of the principal parties to the
original contract. When it is understood that practically all of the trans-
actions which this "Code" will cover involve interstate commerce, and that
it may never be uniformly adopted in all states, the potentialities of mis-
chief for this section are legion. The practical effect would be that each
statutory or judicial departure from the uniform rule in any state would be
potentially multiplied by the number of other states touching its transactions.
This would be the death of uniformity. There would be the further difficulty
that in international trade, the courts would be instructed to apply the law
of the American forum to the details of the commerce of the world. This
would not increase our popularity abroad.
But the difficulty does not end there. Article 4 on Bank Collections pro-
vides that "the liability of the bank for action taken by it in the course of
collections is governed by the law of the place where the bank is located.""1 "
So a different rule of law applies especially for the benefit of banks. In the
case of secured transactions, Article 9, the law of the principal office of the
debtor or the assignor of the accounts governs. 1 3 Now applying these ex-
ceptions to the illustrations above, the law of Massachusetts, the location of
the office of debtor, applies to him. The law of California to the discounting
bank and the law of the state of its own locality to each bank in the process
of collecting the paper; then the law of any of the other dozen or more states
which by chance the goods or paper happen to touch, may govern the rest
of the parties to the deal depending upon where the "Code" is enacted. Just
how any court, even with the wisdom of a Solomon, can administer such a
law is not dear.
When it is remembered that the complete adoption of the statutes which
this "Code" purports to replace has taken over fifty years and is not yet con-
summated, at least a half a century of confusion seems to be assured by these
provisions alone."14
Some measure of relief is accorded by Section 1-105(6) which allows the
parties to stipulate the governing law in advance, but woe to the unsophisti-
cated who do not know or use this provision.
111. The effect of this history is discussed at length in B~uim's BRANNAN, ssupra
note 16, c. V.
112. § 4-102(2).
113. § 9-103.
114. See Braucher, Federal Enactment of the Uniform Commercial Code, 16 LAW
AND CONT. PROB. 100, 104 (1951).
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THERE Is NOT SUFFICIENT IMPROVEMENT IN SUBSTANTIVE PRoVIsIoNs
To JUSTIFY REPLACEMENT OF THE PRESENT UNIFORM STATUTES
There would be no object in risking all of the confusion and difficulties
mentioned above unless this "Code" were an outstanding improvement upon
the statutes which it seeks to replace. Unfortunately, this is not the case.
Articles 2, 3 and 7; Sales, Commercial Paper, and Documents of Title,
making up fifty-five percent of the "Code" do little more than duplicate
existing uniform statutes already adopted in an overwhelming majority of
the jurisdictions. The Uniform Laws on Sales, Warehouse Receipts and
Bills of Lading covering Articles 2 and 7 of the "Code," incidentally, its
best parts, have been extremely successful in their administration by the courts.
This is partly due to their excellent draftsmanship and partly to the fact
that the treatise on sales by their principal draftsman, Professor Williston," 5
has made it possible for the courts to work out the intention of the act in
most cases. Professor Llewellyn, the chief draftsman of the "Code" has long
believed that he could create a better statute; but the preceding material in-
dicates that he has failed to do so, and most of the comments written to date
on these parts of the "Code" seem to concur.""
In the field covered by the Negotiable Instruments Law, because it was
the first and most widely adopted of the statutes and because it was accom-
panied by no commissioners' notes or authoritative treatise, there have been
numerous conflicting decisions and numerous amendments. But of late, much
of this confusion in the decisions has tended to disappear through re-publi-
cation of the commissioners' notes and the consequent better understanding
of the Negotiable Instruments Law itself.117 As indicated elsewhere and in
much more detail, Article 3 on Commercial Paper fails miserably both in
scope and in vocabulary to be as good as the present Negotiable Instruments
Law."' In its scope it goes back to the British Bills of Exchange Act cover-
hag only checks, drafts, promissory notes and certificates of deposit. But it
goes even further back to English commercial law to revive many of the con-
cepts found there which had been completely abandoned in modem practice.
As indicated above, its language is as novel and difficult as any in the "Code",
115. VmLISTON ON SAiEs (1909) (2d ed. 1924) (Rev. ad. 1948). All this learning
is set aside by the "Code."
116. Williston, The Law of Sales in the Uniform Commercial Code, 63 Htnv. L REV.
561 (1950); Waite, The Proposed Uniform Sales Act, 48 Mim. L. REv. 603 (1950);
See Rabel, The Sales Law in the Proposed Commrcial Code, 17 U. oF Cm. L. Rnv.
427 (1950); Latty, Sales and Title in the Proposed Code, 16 LAw A-.D CONT. PRoD. 3
(1951) ; Comment, Remedies for Total Breach of Contract Under the Uniform Rcvised
Sales Act, 57 Y¥'m L. J. 1360 (1948); but see Corbin, The Uniform Commercial Code
Should It Be Enacted, 59 YA.E L. J. 821 (1950).
117. See Ba sx- ON NxNorri~mr INsTu uNTs iii (Beutel's 6th ed. 1933).
118. Beutel, Comparison of the Proposed Commercial Code Article 3, and Tlhe
Negotiable Instruments Law, 30 NEBs. L. REv. 531 (1951).
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and commentators on earlier drafts almost uniformly agree that it has failed
to accomplish its purpose of substantial improvement on the Negotiable In-
struments Law.119
As a matter of substantive law, therefore, there would be no net gain and
probably considerable loss by adopting the fifty-five percent of the "Code"
which would repeal these four earlier statutes.
Articles 8 and 9, Investment Securities and Secured Transactions, replace
the Uniform Stock Transfer Act and the Uniform Conditional Sales Act,
and parts of the Negotiable Instruments Law, making considerable addition
thereto. Article 8, only eight percent of the "Code," covers the negotiability
of corporate stocks and bonds and would be an improvement if it were not
for errors in draftsmanship such as its treatment of bona fide purchaser dis-
cussed above and others such as the provision in Section 8-301(2) that a
"bona fide purchaser acquires perfect title to the security" rather than hold-
ing "the instrument free from any defect of title from prior parties, and free
from defenses available to prior parties.' 2 0 As this provision is now worded,
fiduciaries, agents, trustees and other persons acting in a representative
capacity take the paper free and clear of claims of their principals. 121 Errors
of this type, which are numerous,'2 make adoption in the present form
highly inadvisable. If Article 8 were worded to correspond to current legal
vocabulary it might well be adopted as a separate uniform statute, but actually
there is no need to adopt the whole "Code" in its present form just to get
codification on the subject of corporate securities.
In theory, Article 9 on Secured Transactions is a laudable attempt to re-
place the Uniform Conditional Sales Act with one enactment covering all
security transactions providing for means of perfecting the security, trans-
fer of the principal paper for which security is given and of securities them-
selves; also for recording for the protection of the security holder and third
parties. There is no doubt that a uniform code providing a workable basis
for accomplishing these ends would be a great step forward but it is doubt-
ful whether Article 9 has accomplished these ends. It is the boast of the
draftsmen that
"Article 9 deliberately cuts loose from all anchorage in the past. It cuts
across what have been regarded as separate fields of law, introduces a
119. Palmer, Negotiable instruments Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 48
MicH. L. Rzv. 255 (1950) ; Kripke, Chattel Paper as a Negotiable Security Uptder the
Unifomn Comnwrcal Code, 59 YALE L. J. 1209 (1950); Comment, The Fictitious Payee
and the U.C.C.The Demise of a Ghost, 18 U. OF Cui. L. Rav. 281 (1951); but see
Cosway, Innovations in Articles Three and Four of the Unifonm Commercial Code, 16
LAW AND CONT PROD. 284 (1951).
120. N.I.L § 57.
121. This defect is discussed at length in Beutel, The Proposed Uniform Commner-
cial Code, 16 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 141, 149 ff. (1951).
122. §§ 7-502(1) (a) (b) ; 3-305, 8-301(2), 8-304 supra note 65.
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completely new terminology, incidentally repeals much old law, and in
the process creates, and attempts to solve, new problems of its own."123
But no economic data is offered to show that such a sweeping change in
the law is necessary, and there seems to be little, if any, supporting research
to indicate that of all the possible changes, this is the one most likely to
succeed in better regulating the security field.
It seems to be a rash shot in the dark with plenty of defects. In the first
place, it is so complicated in its concepts of the law involved and so intricate
in its draftsmanship as to defy description in an article of this scope. An en-
tire treatise would be required to untangle and describe the legal concepts
created in this Article. Already there has been as much written about it as
the whole of the rest of the "Code."'- 4 A few examples will tend to illustrate
the problems of interpretation involved.
Section 9-302, dealing with the question of when filing is required to pro-
tect a security agreement provides that in the case of consumers goods and
farm equipment "not in excess of $2500.00" no filing is necessary to perfect
a security interest for purchase money, i.e., a conditional sale and the like.
But under the provisions of Section 9-307(2) such an interest must be filed
to protect against a bona fide purchaser of such goods for his own use. It is
hard to see what difference recording would make to such a purchaser but,
nevertheless, it is one of the numerous exceptions within exceptions found
all through this article.
Section 9-206 makes the transferability of negotiable paper secured by se-
curity agreements depend on whether the goods dealt in are consumers goods
or otherwise. And a definition of consumers goods 125 does not make it clear
123. Gilmore, The Secured Transactions Article of the Connmercial Code, 16 LAw
& CoNTmp. PROB. 27, 28 (1951). "See Comment No. 3 to § 9-105 (Spring Draft 1950)
referring to the terms 'debtor' and 'secured lender' used in Article 9: 'It is necessary
to have a set of terms to describe the parties to a security transaction, but the selection
of the set of terms applicable to any one of the existing forms (for example, mortgagor
and mortgagee) might carry to some extent the implication that the existing law refer-
able to that form was to be used for the construction and interpretation of this Article.
Since it is desired to avoid any such implication, a set of terms having no common-law
or statutory roots has been chosen."
124. Article 9 has been discussed, among others, in the following articles: Dunham,
Inventory iud Accounts Receivable Financing, 62 HAav. L Rm. 583 (1949); Llewellyn,
Problems of Codifyi;g Security Law, 13 LAw & CoNT-mzp. ProD. 687 (1943); Ireton,
The Proposed Commercial Code: A New Deal in Chattel Security, 43 Ii.. L. Rnv. 794
(1949); Kripke, The "Secured Transactions" Protisions of the Uniform Conwncrcial
Code, 35 Va. L. Rv. 577 (1949) ; K.ipke, Chattel Paper as a Ncgotiable Specalty under
the Uniform Commercial Code, 59 YALEn L. J. 1209 (1950); Gilmore, The Securcd
Transactions Article of the Commercial Code, Everett, Securing Security, Countryman,
The Secured Transactions Article of the Connercial Code and Section 60 of the Banll-
ruptcy Act, all in 16 LAw & Coxrm-v. PROB. 27, 49 and 76 (1951). All of 13 LAY: &
CoNTEmp. PRoB. 553-702 (1948) was devoted to the problem.
125. § 9-109(1) : Good are
(1) "consumer goods" if they are used or bought for use primarily for personal,
family or household purposes.
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whether an inventory of the same articles in a merchant's shop falls within
the technical definition of consumers goods or not.120 But, at any rate,
whether or not the holder of negotiable paper secured by such agreements
for the sale of consumers goods can enforce his rights against the purchaser
is made to depend upon the form of which he brings his suit against the pur-
chaser.'2 7 If he sues to enforce the security agreement, in such case he is not
a holder in due course. On the other hand, if he sues on the Negotiable paper
itself instead of enforcing the security agreement he apparently has the rights
of a holder in due course.' 28 Sub-section (2)129 of this same Section also creates
a new type of negotiation based upon a fictitious agreement not to assert
claims or defenses against the holder in due course of negotiable paper and
the security agreement. This apparently gives security agreements transferred
with negotiated paper only such transferability as can be achieved by contracts
for the benefit of a third party and estoppel. Transferees of finders, thieves,
converters and similar wrong doers who break the chain of assignment ap-
parently have no rights in the security unless we also fictitiously assume that
the holder in due course of negotiable paper so secured has fictitiously read,
understood and relied upon the fictitious agreement which is presumed to
have been made by the purchaser.' 80 When one considers that these results
could have all been accomplished by the simple words that "security agree-
ments attached to negotiable instruments are as negotiable as the instrument
itself,"' 3'1 one sees that so far as draftsmanship is concerned, this is truly
the mad genius article of the "Code."
One further example will suffice. In attempting to cover all possible situa-
tions this Article has been drafted in long and complicated sections contain-
126. § 9-109(4) : "inventory" if they are held or are being prepared for sale or are
to be furnished under a contract of service or if they are raw materials, work in] process
or materials used or consumed in a business. If goods are inventory they are neither
farm products nor equipment.
127. § 9-206(1): An agreement by a buyer of consuner goods as part of the con.
tract for sale that he will not assert against an assignee any claim or defense arising out
of the sale is not enforceable by any person. If such a buyer as part of one transaction
signs both a negotiable instrument and a security agreement even a holder in due course
of the iwgotiable instrument is subject to such claims or defenses if he seeks to enforce
the security interest either by proceeding under the security agreemcnt or by attaching
or levying upon the goods in an action upon the instrument.
128. §§ 3-112, 3-119, 9-309.
129. § 9-206(2) : In all other cases an agreement by a buyer that he will not assert
against an assignee any claim or defense arising out of the sale is enforceable by an as-
signee who takes his assignment for value, in good faith and without notice of a claim
or defense, except as to defenses of a type which may be asserted against a holder in due
course of a negotiable instrunent under the Article on Commercial Paper [Article 3J.
A buyer who as part of one transaction signs both a negotiable instrument and a security
agreement makes such an agreement.
130. See, Beutel, Negotiability by Contract, 28 ILL. L. REv. 205, 219 (1933).
131. See suggestion of Kripke, Chattel Paper as a Negotiable Security, 59 YAtX L. J.
1209, 1227 (1950).
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ing exceptions within exceptions and exceptions on exceptions. Section 9-312,
extending over two pages, starts off: "When conflicting security interests
are attached to the same collateral, such interests rank in the order of time
of perfection with the following exceptions:" and then foUllow eight sub-sec-
tions of exceptions covering two full pages. Sub-sections (1), (3), (4) and
(5) contain successive exceptions to each other and sub-section (8) refers to
three other sections,132 themselves over two pages long, which are exceptions
to this section and in turn contain numerous sub-exceptions of their own.
Here the genius of draftsmanship reaches its full fruition.
It need scarcely be said that the Uniform Conditional Sales Act which this
article intends To replace and enlarge, now covers bailment leases and con-
ditional sales in fairly clear and simple language. The advantages of broader
coverages if any, set out in Article 9 are more than offset by the complicated
draftsmanship and the administrative set up which provides three or four
places for filing various types of security agreements.133 In fact, the proce-
dure is so complicated that no secured creditor can safely protect his interests
without expert legal advice, if at all.
This portion of the discussion so far has accounted for eighty-five percent
of the subject matter of the "Code" and there seems to be no valid reason
why the present uniform laws should be replaced by these articles of the
"Code." On the contrary, the present uniform laws are far more useful than
the new provisions would be if enacted.
The remaining fifteen percent of the "Code" which is new covers bulk
transfers, letters of credit and bank collections. The first, Article 6, Bulk
Transfers, is not particularly significant because the business involved in
this area of sales is mostly local and seldom involves conflict of laws. Most
states have fairly acceptable statutes on this subject and there is little necessity
therefore for the adoption of uniform statutes in this field.
The Documentary Letters of Credit Article constituting only three per-
cent of the "Code" is new. If, on further study, it proves useful, it could be
detached and enacted as a uniform statute with less confusion than to leave
it in the present code.
ARTICLE 4 -BANK DEPOSITS AND COLLECTIONS, Is A PIECE OF
Vicious CLASS LEGISLATION
There remains therefore only the discussion of Article 4 on Bank Col-
lections. This constitutes eight percent of the entire "Code" and needs
careful scrutiny both as to its history and its substantive provisions. For a
long time the statutes and decisions on bank collections have been in a very
bad state. In the face of conflicting decisions and statutes on almost every
aspect of the subject, bankers have been adopting the device of contracts to
132. §§ 9-313, 9-314, and 9-315.
133. § 9-401.
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protect themselves against losses which might occur in the collection process.
These fine print provisions placed on deposit slips, savings account books,
notes and other forms used by the bank usually provide that the transaction
involved is carried on in the risk of the consumer and that the bank is to be
free of any resulting liability even for its own negligence. The courts have
often cast a jaundiced eye upon these agreements but the law concerning their
effectiveness has long been in a state of confusion. The Uniform Laws Com-
mission has from time to time struggled with the problem of creating a uni-
form bank collections code. At one time they prepared such a statute but it
failed of approval in the Commission itself because of opposition by the banks
and their counsel. While the preliminary discussion of this process was still
going on in the Uniform Laws Commission, the American Bankers Associa-
tion through its counsel drafted a law covering the bank collection process
designed to protect the banks throughout the process of collection, throwing
the loss on the customers while giving the banks the rights of holders of due
course in the paper involved. 13 4 This was dressed up under the deceiving
title of the Uniform Bank Collections Code and was sold by the banking lobby
to about nineteen legislatures 135 meeting over a period of about two years,
who seemed to have adopted it under the mis-apprehension that it was a
product of the Uniform Laws Commission. Thereafter, a number of authori-
ties in the field of banking and negotiable instruments wrote articles exposing
the true nature of this so-called collections code and adoptions by the legis-
latures thereafter practically ceased.' 3 6
The act has been declared unconstitutional in whole 137 or in part 108 by
the courts of a number of states. The result is continuing confusion, About
twenty-seven states have the common law or fragmentary adoptions on the
subject, the rest have the American Bankers Association Bank Collections
Code or something like it. It may be unconstitutional in whole or in part,
Not a very pretty picture.
The draftsman of the Commercial Code realized this situation and set out
to produce a uniform act fair to both the bankers and the customer to remove
the confusion in this field. Mr. Leary, the original draftsman of this article,
after careful research into banking and clearing house practices and the cur-
rent machinery of collection, attempted to devise a code which would fairly
134. This history is set out in detail by Wilson, 30 ORE. L. Rmy. 359 (1951).
135. See note 16, supra BEUTEL, BANK OFFICERS HANDBOOK 96 (1939).
136. Townsend, The Bank Collections Code, 8 TULANE L. Rmy. 21, 236, 376 (1934)
Steffen, The Check Collection Muddle, 10 id. 537 (1936); Beutel, The Proposed Undfon n
Bank Collections Act, 9 id. 378, 385 (1935); Donley, Some Problens of Collection of
Checks, 38 W. VA. L. Q. 195 (1932); but see Bogert, Failed Banks, Collection hIems
and Trust Preferences, 29 MicH. L. RE;v. 545, 567 (1931).
137. People ex rel. Barrett v. Union Bank, 362 Ill. 164, 199 N.E. 272 (1935).
138. See Note, 104 A.L.R. 1095 and authorities there cited and later supplemnentary
notes.
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state the obligation of the banks to their customers and properly distribute
liability and risk of loss. By May of 1951 this draft'29 had almost reached
the final stage but it was met by the unanimous opposition of the American
Banker's Association and counsel and lobbyists who were constantly in at-
tendance at the joint meetings of the Uniform Laws Commission and the
American Law Institute. The result of the pressure was so great that in May,
1951 it was decided to omit Article 4 on Bank Collections for the Uniform
Commerical Code, and to recommend the "Code" without it. Mr. Leary,
with his ideas of fairness, was thus effectively side-tracked. The reduced
"Code" was then finally adopted subject only to minor changes before the
meeting of the American Bar Association in September of the same year.
During the following summer months there occurred frenzied activity on the
part of the bankers and their counsel with the result that late in August
before the fall meeting of the Commissioners on Uniform Laws and the
American Law Institute in connection with the American Bar Association
there appeared a completely revised Article 4 in fragmentary form ' 40 which
was mailed to members of the Institute and the Commission giving them less
than three weeks time to examine it before the meeting' 41 It was then rushed
through the final joint meeting with little or no debate and -as approved by
the Commissioners, the American Law Institute and the American Bar Asso-
ciation at the same time. It is fair to say that the great majority of the
members of these organizations and those at the meeting had not even read
the complete new Article 4 '4 and that ninety percent of the entire member-
ship had no knowledge of its nature. Shocking as this seems, it was the usual
procedure by which the draftsmen had been presenting the "Code" to the
Institute and Commissioners,143 only in this instance their own technique was
used against them.
This new Article 4 on Bank Deposits and Collections follows very closely
the already discredited American Banker's Association Uniform Bank Col-
lection Code.Y4 It even re-enacts the preference articles which have caused
that act to be held unconstitutional and which are admittedly contrary to cur-
139. See UNIoFOR CoMMMcIAxL CODE, Article 4 (September Revisions 19E).
140. See August 1951 Revision of Article 4 (Mimeographed).
141. The covering letter from the Philadelphia office of the Institute was dated
August 24. The final meeting vras September 15, 1951.
142. A complete text of this new Article 4 was later published under the date Sep-
tember 3, 1951, superseding the August Revision. This article wras still later changed
in at least seven places further to favor the banks; cf. §§ 4-103 (2) (3), 4-205 (2), 4-207(1),
4-213(3), 4-301(4), 4-403(3), 4-407 in the September 3rd edition and the Final Te.-xt
Edition.
143. See Beutel, The Proposed Uniform Commercial Code, 16 LAv & CoNTz-a.
PROB. 141, 142 (1951).
144. See explanation of Principal Changes in August Revision, stpra, note 140,
§§4-103, 4-202, 4-213, 4-214.
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rent federal legislation and not, therefore, applicable to National Banks.14"
However, it goes much further than the American Banker's Association Act
in that it provides that all paper deposited with the bank, unless the con-
tracts indicate otherwise, is left for collection 140 and is to be handled entirely
at the risk of the customer.14 7 The bank, on the other hand, has all the rights
of a holder in due course when it is in any danger of suffering loss. 148 All
liability of the bank for improper handling of paper so carefully and fairly
set up in the earlier drafts 149 is removed. 1 0 By a trick provision of Section
4-103 and sub-section 4,151 the bank is not bound to follow any of the col-
lection procedures set out in the act. So long as it acts "reasonably," it is
only liable for its own lack of good faith and due care ;152 but even due care
is limited by other provisions of the "Code";153 and it is not liable for the
acts of any of its agent or associate banks.5 4 Damages for the lack of due care
and bad faith are carefully held to the minimum ;'5 and any action authorized
by this Article is specifically made due, care for which the bank is not
liable.' 56
145. § 4-214; cf. A.B.A. code provision, ILL. REV. STAT. c. 16a § 37(3) (Cahill 1931),
declared unconstitutional in People ex rel. Barrett, supra note 137; and Explanation of
Principal Changes, August Revision supra note 140, § 4-214.
146. § 4-201: Unless a contrary intent clearly appears, a depositary bank takes an
item for collection regardless of the form of indorsement or lack of indorsetnent and even
though credit for the item is subject to immediate withdrawal as of right.
But see § 4-105 (a). Unless § 4-201 covers all business it is meaningless. See Comment
to §4-201 (December Revision 1951). The A.B.A. Code was ambiguous on this point,
see Illinois Act, supra note 144, § 26.
147. § 4-211(1), §4-212.
148. § 4-209, § 4-208 sipra note 31.
149. §§ 4-109, 4-103 (September Revison 1950).
150. See § 4-103 (August 1951 draft), Explanation of Principal Changes,
151. § 4-103 (4) : The specification or approval of certain procedures by this Article
does not preclude an agreement authorized by sub-section (1), nor constitute disapproval
of other procedures which may be reasonable under the circumstances.
152. § 4-103(1) : The effect of the provisions of this Article may be varied by general
or special agreemnent except that no agreement can disclaim a banl's responsibility or
limit the measure of damages for its own lack of good faith or failure to exercise or-
dinary care.
153. §4-103(3): Action or non action approved by this Article or pussuant to a
general agreement, or, in the the absence of special instructions, consistent with a bank-
ing usage, is ordinary care.
See §§4-108, 4-202(2), 4-203, 4-205(2), 4-210, 4-211.
154. § 4-202(1): A collecting bank must use ordinary care in
(a) presenting an item or sending it for presentment; and ...
(3) Subject to subsection (1) (a), a bank is not liable for the insolvency, neglect,
misconduct, mistake or default of another bank.
See §§4-106, 4-102(2).
155. §§4-103(2), 4-202(3) supra note 154, 4-212(5), 4-402, 4-403(3), 4-404, 4-405,
4-407.
156. §4-103(3) supra note 153.
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Among the more striking of the acts authorized on the part of the bank
are the following. The bank is not bound to any notice from anybody except
the person depositing the paper and need only follow his instructions.'" The
whole concept of payment in due course is abolished.15 The bank can pay
a known thief of properly endorsed paper without any liability and there is
nothing the true owner can do about it except bring an injunction "or supply
indemnity deemed adequate" by the bank.159 There is grave doubt as to
whether a law suit would do the true owner any good under the circum-
stances because the bank is allowed to supply indorsements of customers,1co
and is specifically protected against any form of notice of agency or trust
which may appear on the face of the paper or indorsements.10' The bank
may also change by contract any of the rules set out in this act except the
duty of due care.102 Thus the "Code" appears to completely approve the type
of surreptitious waivers consistently appearing in fine print on bank forms,
in spite of the fact that many courts have refused to enforce "contracts" of
this kind. Article 4 and the definitions of contracts found in the "Code" give
them blanket approval.16
A careful examination of the wording of the act will show that this Article
was drafted entirely with the purpose of protecting the banks so that they
could carry on their business at the risk of the customer. In most instances
they have succeeded, with the aid of their lawyers, in shifting many of the
risks of the banking business to their customers, where fairness in bank col-
lections would require that the bank be the insurer of the paper which it is
to collect. A few examples will show the complete one-sidedness of the "Code."
Although the bank is supposed to be the agent of its customers for all paper
placed in its custody by the customer either for deposit or collection, 10 the
"Code" sets out specifically and in minute detail the warranties which the
customer makes to the bank by the transfer of such paper. 0 5 But where the
bank takes proceeds of the collection process on behalf of its customer no
such warranties are required from the banker. On the contrary, it holds
such paper to be collected at the risk of the customer.'0 0 Where the bank
returns statements to the customer he must, at his peril, examine the state-
ments not only for accuracy of signatures and alterations but also endorse-
157. § 4-203: Only a bank's transferor can give instructions which affect the banh
or constitute notice to it and a bank is not liable to prior parties for any action taken
pursuant to such instructions or in accordance with any agreement with its transferor.




162. §4-103(1) supra note 152.
163. Ibid. And see definition of Agreement and Contract § 1-201(3) and (11).
164. § 4-201 supra note 146.
165. § 4-207.
166. § 4-211. See § 4-212.
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ments; and failure to turn up defects such as forgeries and the like in en-
dorsements within the prescribed time throws the loss on the customer even
though information of this kind is wholly within the knowledge of the banker
and beyond the reach of the customer.'
67
An extreme example of this one-sided draftsmanship is shown in the duties
and liabilities surrounding stop-payment as here codified. The customer still
has the right to stop payment if he does so in the proper form,1 8 but the
banker's liability for wrongfully ignoring stop payment is carefully limited
to the actual loss caused thereby. 09 And though the "Code" does not bother
to state the customers' rights, it specifically provides conditions under which
the bank can sue the customer when it has wrongfully ignored a stop pay-
ment order 17 0 In fact, this Article is so one-sidedly drawn in favor of the
banking interests that any banker who insisted on exercising the rights given
him by this "Code" would probably be under suspicion by the better busi-
ness bureau.
This article is a deliberate sell-out of the American Law Institute and the
Commission of Uniform Laws to the bank lobby in return for their support
of the rest of the "Code." That this would happen was forecast in the debate
before the Institute two years ago when Mr. Schnader in a discussion with
the writer said that it would be necessary to make certain concessions to the
banking interests in order to get their support for the "Code." And it is
significant that Mr. Schnader,1 7 1 was very active in pushing the present
article through the meeting of the Commissioners and the Institute in Sep-
tember even over the apparent protest of the Editor-in-Chief himself. They
not only made concessions to the bankers but delivered everything they
asked for. The banks now have a piece of class legislation more favorable to
their interests than the American Bankers Association Bank Collections Code
167. § 4-406, especially sub-section (1, c).
168. §§ 4-403, 4-303.
169. § 4-103 (2). See §§ 4-402, 4-403 (3).
170. § 4-407: Bank's Right to Subrogation on Improper Payment
To prevent unjust enrichment, a bank which has paid a customer's item which
it may not charge in full to his account may in an action
(a) against a prior holder who has received the payment, recover any part
thereof due to its customer or any prior party in respect of the transaction in
which the customer of the depository bank acquired the item; and
(b) against the drawer, maker or acceptor recover any amount which would
have been due from him on the item if payment had been refused.
The bank has no right to charge the customer's account in respect of such cause
of action. The bank may bring either or both such actions but may have only one
satisfaction and any right to consequential or punitative damages remains with
the customer or holder.
171. First Vice-President of the American Law Institute, see the letter head of the
Institute; Member of the Editorial Board for the "Code"; see Proposed Final Draft
p. 3 (Spring 1950) ; long time counsel for Banks, see I MRmwDALE 1267 (1937) ; and
close associate of bankers, see WHo's WHo IN AmERicA 2086 (1946-47).
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which their lobby failed to put over on the legislatures. This one-sided piece
of class legislation is now backed by the prestige of the American Law In-
stitute and the Commission on Uniform Laws. Such a sell-out is beneath the
dignity of both organizations and is a tremendous blow to their prestige as
scientific bodies. It is doubtful if the majority of the members wvould have
approved this article if they had known what they were doing; and, if they
do so approve, it raises the question whether the American Law Institute
has ceased to be a learned scientific body to become a plush pressure group
dominated by reactionary financial interests. The existence of Article 4 alone
is enough to condemn in its entirety the adoption of this "Code."
CONCLUSION
The experience of the learned bodies sponsoring the "Code" with Article
4 shows the danger of having distinguished lawyers and judges in brief con-
vention assembled or professors in their spare time pass upon and draft com-
plicated commercial legislation. A project of the proportions and wide-spread
effect of the Uniform Commercial Code should be supported by full time,
deep and thorough economic and legal research by the best minds in the field.
It can not be accomplished by the "Let George do it" atmosphere which pre-
*ails at the average American convention and which has, unfortunately, crept
into the proceedings of the American Law Institute and the Commissioners
on Uniform Laws.
On the whole the repeal of the seven current uniform laws and the adop-
tion of this so-called "Code" can serve no purpose except by its complica-
tion and displacement of the law to create unnecessary business for the lav-
yers and the courts. Uniform Commercial Code is a misnomer; it should be
called the Lawyers and Bankers Relief Act. If the "Code" in its present form
is pushed through the New York Legislature by its high sounding backers,
the Act will mark the beginning of the end of fairness and uniformity in the
commercial law.
